Lifestyle diseases constitute an increasing portion of health problems and this trend is likely to continue. A better understanding of the responsibility argument is important for the assessment of policies aimed at meeting challenge. Holding individuals accountable for their choices in the context of health care is, however, controversial.
Introduction
People make different choices about how to live their lives. These choices also affect their health, the risks they face and their need for medical treatment in the future. A key question is how considerations of individual responsibility should enter into the design of the health care policies. Two issues are of particular importance in this context. First, if the same treatment is given to all patients the total cost of treatment will depend on how people behave. We then need to consider whether, and to what extent, the distribution of the costs of treatment should be related to a patient's behaviour. Second, in a situation where the budgets for health care are limited, it is necessary to ration treatment. Another important question is therefore whether the extent to which a disease is a result of individual choices should be allowed to affect the degree to which it is given priority.
Studies from WHO show that most of the leading risk factors contributing to the burden of disease in high-income countries can be attributed to unhealthy life style (table 1) . WHO has also estimated that "in the developed countries of North America, Europe and the Asian Pacific, at least one-third of all disease burden is attributable to these five risk factors: tobacco, alcohol, blood pressure, cholesterol and obesity". 1 The idea that individuals must take responsibility for their own health is also an increasingly focused topic in the popular press. Articles on health, fitness and selfhelp seem to comprise an increasing portion of consumer-directed feature articles in newspapers.
( Table 1 about here) Holding individuals accountable for their choices in the context of health care is, however, controversial. [2] [3] [4] The aim of the article is to propose a plausible interpretation of liberal egalitarianism with respect to responsibility and health care
and assess it against reasonable counter-arguments.
Two types of arguments for the importance of responsibility in health care
What does it mean to hold somebody responsible in the context of health policy? We shall say that any health policy that links either the relative payment for treatment or the extent of treatment to factors that are under the individuals control holds individuals responsible.
Generally there are two types of reasons why we would want to link treatment or payment to individual behaviour. The first type is backwards looking and linked to the idea that the distribution of burden and benefits should be linked to how different individuals contributed to the creation of these burdens and benefits. Applied to health policy this implies that in order to determine how treatment or the cost of treatment should be distributed we must ask how the need for treatment arose. More precisely it argues that the extent to which an individual contributed to the need for treatment might be a morally relevant factor. The basic intuition behind this view is that individuals are free to make certain choices about how to live their life and that they should be held responsible for such choices to the extent it affects their need for treatment. For example, since smoking increases the risk for cancer and cardiovascular disease, people who freely decide to smoke should be held accountable for this choice.
The backward looking responsibility argument has been most important as an argument for not including certain types of treatment in public health care systems.
Most people would for example agree that the costs of surgical removal of tattoos should be paid by the patient himself and not by the public. 5 This intuition holds even if the subjective suffering is equal to that associated with disfiguring birthmarks, the removal of which is typically financed by the public.
The second type of reasons are consequentialist and forward-looking.
Consequentialist normative theories evaluate alternatives by comparing their consequences and the best alternative is simply the one that has the best consequences. Consequentialist arguments are not concerned with what individuals have done, but rather with how they will behave in the future. It links the distribution of costs or treatment to behaviour because it wants to affect future behaviour in a certain way by creating incentives or disincentives for certain types of behaviour.
Holding individuals responsible for their choices is seen simply as a means to an end.
Many prominent normative theories of distributive justice only focus on the second of these two reasons. For example, the QALY approach requires that limited resources are distributed between alternative treatments so as to maximize health outcomes in terms of quality adjusted life years. [6] [7] [8] [9] Such consequentialist theories are forwardlooking and exclude all types of backward-looking considerations.
The arguments for health promotion in the literature are also based on forward looking or consequentialist normative theories, such as utilitarianism. The idea is that in order to promote health people must face the right incentives. 10 Holding people responsible for their choices with respect to unhealthy life-styles could be justified purely by incentive arguments. Incentive-mechanisms are often implemented at population level. Taxes and laws governing conduct can discourage people smoking and excessive drinking. 11 Governments or insurance plans could cover in full screening programmes such as mammography, smoking cessation programs, vaccinations as well as testing and treatment for sexually transmitted diseases in order to encourage such behaviour. 10 Both negative and positive incentives can play a role in health promotion.
The disincentive argument has also been important in the design of effective treatment procedures. Many physicians, as well as national commissions on priorities, argue that patients should be held responsibility for actions affecting the effectiveness of treatment. [12] [13] [14] [15] For example, continuous smoking will negatively affect the outcome of coronary by-pass surgery as well as surgery for claudicatio intermittens. Continuous intravenous drug abuse might interfere with the effect of valve replacements because of re-infections. 10 Excessive drinking reduces the chance of organ survival after liver transplantation. 16 Consequently, many doctors argue that they are justified in requiring behavioural change if this is necessary for the treatment to be effective and should be allowed to refuse treatment if these requirements are not followed.
The implications of the forward looking and the backward looking perspective often coincide. Clearly, one way of creating incentives is exactly to link payment or treatment to past behaviour. However, even if the implications of the backward looking and the forward looking arguments sometimes coincide, this is far from always the case, and the difference in justification can hardly be exaggerated. This is easily seen by considering the situation in which there is no incentive effects, i.e.
where peoples behaviour is unaffected by the incentive structure. In such a situation there is no forward looking reason for relating treatment or payment to past behaviour but a backward looking argument might still be relevant. To illustrate, consider a situation where smoking behaviour is unaffected by taxes on tobacco. In such a situation there would be no incentive reason for tobacco taxes, but it could still be argued that those who smoke should pay the expected cost of treatment.
Despite these powerful arguments, individual responsibility is, as we noted in the introduction, in general rejected as an important criterion in the distribution of resources in health care. [2] [3] [4] We agree that there are forceful reasons why individual responsibility has been relegated to the background of political and theoretical arguments about distributive justice in health care. Below we consider two types of arguments that justify this state of affairs.
Two types of arguments against individual responsibility
It is convenient to distinguish between normative and practical arguments against letting individual responsibility for health be an important factor in the distribution of health care. The latter are often as compelling as the former.
We shall distinguish between three different normative objections. The first normative objection to holding individuals accountable is what we will call the humanitarian objection. According to this objection we have an obligation to help people in dire straits no matter why they are in such a situation provided that helping is possible and would not impose unacceptable sacrifices on those who are helping. 17 Consider the long time smoker who at age 60 develops coronary heart disease. He now suffers from angina pectoris and is at risk for getting a myocardial infarction, or even a stroke. The cardiologist makes further diagnostic tests and tells him he needs a PCI.
Many think it would be a harsh judgement to deny him the procedure because the disease could be said to be self-inflicted. The humanitarian concern would be even stronger if we assume that the patient already has acquired a myocardial infarction, is suffering great pain and are at high risk of dying. Should treatment be denied him?
Many would strongly object to this. 18 If people are forced to pay for their own treatment when the need for treatment can be said to be self-inflicted, then we are holding individuals responsible for too much.
The second type of objections hold that even if individual responsibility for health might be important in principle, introducing such considerations into actual policy is difficult and will create a new type of problems.
The informational objection is concerned with two types of problems. The first problem is related to asymmetric information about a patient's past behaviour.
Typically, the patient knows far more about his or her own past behaviour than the doctor. If this asymmetry is to be corrected there is a danger of jeopardizing the physician-patient relationship. The physician providing treatment is the most likely person to enforce the necessary measures for holding patients responsible for the consequences of their actions and to gather information about past behaviour. For example, denial of care based on this rationale can seriously undermine the physician's identity as care-giver and thus the physician-patient relation itself.
Moreover, the physician being assigned a controlling role might easily intrude on patients' privacy. A second informational problem is related to the fact that information about the relationship between behaviour and the need for treatment often is uncertain even when information about the patients past behaviour is readily available. Although much is known about the relation between unhealthy life styles and disease, these are strongly mediated by genetic and environmental factors.
Establishing a causal relationship between behaviour and outcomes is difficult for most conditions and it is difficult to establish with certainty that a particular type of behaviour is the sole cause of the disease in question. 13 The objection of non-neutrality is concerned with the possibility that only certain types of risky behaviour will be identified as of special concern. What kind of risky behaviour should be identified as of special concern? Why should smokers be 'punished' while those who eat too much or exercise too little are not? One such important worry is the possibility of opening up for 'moralism'. 19 How do we draw the line between 'justified' inequalities and 'moralistic' judgements about a person's choice or character? A liberal state should be neutral as to the ways of life people choose.
Identification of those types of behaviour people should be held responsible for should be determined by the impact on health. But considering the high emotions aroused when tobacco, alcohol and unsafe sex are debated, there is reason to fear that in practice it is difficult to draw this line. but not the resources they receive in the social and natural "lottery". 22 Applied to the context of health care the principle of equalization implies that all individuals who make the same choices should be treated as if they were identical with respect to all factors outside their own control, i.e. as if they had the same disposition to become sick and faced the same health risks.
It is important to distinguish the liberal egalitarian theory from the liberalist theory.
Both theories are concerned with the equalization of opportunities, but while liberal egalitarian theories want to eliminate the effect of all factors outside the individuals' control, the liberalists are primarily concerned with non-discrimination. Liberals who argue for equal opportunities are mostly concerned about eliminating formal and informal barriers. They are not supporting a substantial positive commitment to securing equal opportunities ("levelling the playing field"). In other words, the liberal argument is more focused on responsibility and only formally interested in equality. 18 Having said this, we are now in a position to state a common misunderstanding of liberal egalitarianism. The most important misinterpretation is that these theories argue that individuals should be held responsible for the consequences of their choice.
In the context of health care this would imply that individuals should be refused 
Holding people responsible for their choices through taxes
To see the implications of this view it is useful to consider an example. Consider a situation in which physicians and the health care system treat all individuals as equals, regardless of the choices they have made. That is, everyone is given the best available treatment. The question then becomes how we should distribute the costs of treatment between individuals in the economy. Assume furthermore that the need for treatment of a particular disease is proportionally related to the consumption of a particular good, e.g. tobacco, and that this good can be taxed. In this situation the implication of the liberal egalitarian theory is straightforward. The liberal egalitarian theory would, in the absence of an efficient insurance market, want to tax tobacco in order to finance the costs of treatment rather than to require that patients pay for their own treatment.
The theory does not determine uniquely how the level of taxes should be determined, but one plausible alternative would be to set the per-unit taxes on tobacco so that the total tax revenues are equal to the additional cost of treatment associated with smoking. Another implication of the theory is that all smokers should pay the same tax rate independent of their genetic disposition and the expected cost of their treatment. To do otherwise would violate the principle that all individual who make the same choice also should face the same costs.
Let us now examine how this way of introducing individual responsibility avoids the objections discussed above. The first point to note is that holding people responsible The use of the tax-mechanism will not eliminate the problem of non-neutrality. It will still be possible to use the responsibility argument as a way to introduce 'moralistic' judgement. However, it is likely to reduce this problem, since tax policies will typically be decided through democratic procedures and not by individuals in the health care system.
Discussion
Even if we believe that the liberal egalitarian response answers many of the objections, there are still problems with this approach. A fundamental -and remaining issue -is the informational problem of drawing the precise cut between those factors that are under a person's control and those that are outside. New genetic knowledge might clarify which risk factors are attributable to choice and which are not. We therefore believe that as we get more genetic information on susceptibility, the understanding of individual responsibility within liberal egalitarianism might become increasingly more important.
Moreover, people have different probabilities of becoming a smoker or an alcoholic depending on family background, social class etc.. It is well documented that not only is unhealthy behaviour statistically more likely among people who are poor, but also that people with lower socio-economic status on average have lower health. This suggests that it can be misleading to view unhealthy behaviour as freely chosen (see Roemer for a good discussion on this point 25 ). taxable product. It is relatively easy to levy taxes on consumer goods, but how should we tax choices such as exercising too little or having unsafe sex? Although it is possible to assign tax exemptions to membership in fitness clubs, on condoms etc, we acknowledge the problem that not all unhealthy life style choices can be handled in the same way.
In this paper we have focused on the liberal egalitarian argument for holding individuals responsible for their choices. This argument must, of course, be combined with the incentive argument. We have ignored the incentive argument in most of our discussion in order to focus on the backward looking responsibility arguments for holding individuals responsible. Even if peoples' behaviour is totally unaffected by the existence of taxes, in which case there is no incentive argument for taxes, we still argue that justice requires that smokers or others who make risky choices should contribute more to the financing of health care. 
